Clarifying the ‘#NeverTrump’ Position & Undercutting Moral Indignation: Half-Baked Idea

As a preliminary remark, I was #NeverTrump in 2016. Right now, I don’t know how I will vote in 2020. But it seems to me that many who were #NeverTrump in 2016 have adopted some sloppy thinking and even some tribalist tendencies that the movement was originally bucking against. This is especially so, in my opinion, among evangelical #NeverTrump proponents.

‘#NeverTrump’ (henceforth, ‘#NT’) proponents need to clarify the nature of their objection to voting for Trump.

(1) Factual Dispute. A factual dispute would relate to misdiagnosing the situation. One may think the form of the argument is fine, but that the factual content of the argument is wrong.

(2) Normative Dispute. One might think of this as a formal dispute, but I want to emphasize the ethical dimension wrapped up in this particular case. A formal dispute may grant that the factual side of the argument is fine, but think the way the premises are related is faulty. In this case, by normative dispute I mean that the ethical theory being applied to those facts is wrong.

Returning to (1), when #NTs mount a critique of Trump supporters, it’s almost always at the factual level. An example here would be the “Flight 93 mindset.” The idea is that Trump supporters have misdiagnosed the facts of the situation if they think that Trump losing in 2020 will mean the end of America.

Returning to (2), something like this mindset seems to explain the amount of moral finger-wagging that #NTs engage in. They often seem morally outraged that Republicans, and especially evangelicals, could be supporting Trump in 2020. An example here would be Jonah Goldberg’s critique of utilitarianism or Ben Howe’s critique of lesser-evil arguments.

(3) Factual and Normative. An obvious response to this would be that it’s BOTH (1) and (2)! But I have my doubts. Whenever I’ve seen the normative dispute raised, it usually (a) collapses into a factual dispute — as with Jonah Goldberg’s recent critique of utilitarianism (cf. my response to objection 3 here) — or (b) is simply philosophically confused — as with Joe Carter’s recent critique of consequentialist thinking (cf. Jeremy Pierce taking it apart in his string of replies here) or Ben Howe’s book from last year (cf. the second part of my review here, though I could have stated it better).

In fact when #NTs try to hold onto (3), it can lead to, at worst, a motte-and-bailey argument from the #NTs who start off with moral finger-wagging at how anyone, let alone a Christian, could support Trump, but then retreat to a simple disagreement of the facts of the situation when the normative argument quickly runs out of steam. But are #NTs entitled to an expectation that “evangelicals” (it is always a broad brush critique) have access to the same facts as #NTs?

This third position can have — and I think has had — some harmful consequences. One is that it can lead to — and I think in some instances has led to—a sort of self-righteousness on the part of #NTs that is based on either naivety or confusion. The other is that it leads to more tribalism and polarization. The Trump supporters, maybe mostly at a gut level, realize there’s something inaccurate about the way their own position is being characterized or in the anti-consequentialist straw-man arguments.

Let’s take David French for example. The moral disgust he is frequently expressing at his fellow evangelicals doesn’t seem consonant with the disagreement if it’s merely a factual dispute. If it’s merely a factual dispute, why so indignant? If most evangelicals had the time or capacity to think through the factual issues at the level of David French, David French would probably be out of a job. So why not show them some sympathy? Because, I think, lurking beneath the factual dispute is a suspicion of moral deficiency.

This leads to a fourth option that is somewhat related.

(4) Factual Dispute Owing to Normative Dispute. This sort of dispute links (1) and (2) in a way that they aren’t necessarily linked in (3). In this case, the reason someone thinks ‘x’ is a fact is due to the ethical lens they’ve adopted. An obvious example here might be the way that a racist constructs “scientific racism” to support his unethical prejudice.

In such cases, it’s legitimate to think that someone could only find such “facts” persuasive if they already have a moral deficiency which is filtering or twisting the facts. I think there are plenty of examples of how some Trump supporters have become guilty of this distortion even if they didn’t start out that way in their Trump support. In fact, there is nothing special between (4) and Trump supporters, because it is, perhaps, the most obvious, if not the most common, way that tribalism manifests itself.

But this also leads to the point that #NTs can be in danger of developing the sort of tribalism manifested in (4). When #NTs distort or exaggerate something Trump says or something a Trump supporter says, this might be a nascent (4)-tribalism manifesting itself. When #NTs have an unclarified or confused moral indignation at “evangelical Trump supporters” broadly framed by the worst examples on social media, this might be a nascent (4)-tribalism manifesting itself.

I stress the word “might” above because knowing what is motivating a factual dispute is difficult when we aren’t entitled to the expectation that someone have access to all the same facts that we do. In other words, knowing that someone doesn’t see or acknowledge the facts as we do because they are immorally motivated is difficult in most cases. Take for example David French’s recent anecdote about the prominent pastor he was talking to that was mistaken on the facts surrounding the Flynn case (on one of the Dispatch podcasts last week). Does French have a reasonable expectation that the pastor was factually mistaken because of some moral deficiency? I don’t think French would say this. It’s perfectly reasonable that the pastor was non-culpably mistaken or mislead.

We should extend that same charity to people in general — including strangers on social media. Or, rather, we should exercise that same humility with regard to others. This is especially so with regard to “Trump supporters” or “evangelical Trump supporters” broadly conceived of, since we really don’t have sufficient warrant for thinking that our factual disputes must be motivated by moral deficiency. Further, such an assumption is counter-productive since the tone of moral indignation tends towards entrenching tribalism on all sides.

P. S. One think I’d like to “bake” some more is the way in which (1) and (2) can act as feedback for (4) and vice versa. This further complicates the issue, but that also is more reason to exercise humility in our judgment of particular cases or broad-brush diagnosis.