W. L. Craig on Moo, Wright, and the Righteousness of God
In Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration, William Lane Craig offers some criticism of Douglas Moo’s position on the phrase “righteousness of God” and the NPP. Since I’ve been working through Moo’s Romans commentary for the last 7 months, that’s of interest to me. Craig’s remarks on Moo are mainly in a footnote in the context of Craig’s criticism of Wright and the NPP:
The implausibility of the new perspective’s reductionism is perhaps best seen by asking what the opposite of righteousness — that is unrighteousness — is said by Paul to be. It is not unfaithfulness, but wickedness and ungodliness (Rom 1:18) or lawlessness (2 Cor 6:14).[6]
[6] Since righteousness is the opposite of wickedness and ungodliness, it should become obvious, if it is not already, that “righteousness” is the nominalization of a property righteous, just as “wisdom” is the nominalization of wise and “power” of powerful. Righteousness is not, therefore, as is often asserted, an activity of God. Those who say that God’s righteousness is His “eschatological justifying or vindicating activity” (Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” 124) or “the justifying activity of God,” including “his eschatological intervention to vindicate and deliver his people” (Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, New International Commentary on the New Testament [Grand Rapids: eerdmans, 1996], 222) are speaking ungrammatically. Moo compounds the confusion when he says that ‘from the human side it includes the status of acquittal acquired by the persons so declared just’ (222). Such status may be an effect of God’s saving activity, but what sense does it make to speak of such a status as included in God’s saving activity? See as well, from the new perspective, the inconsistent characterization by Onesti and Brauch of the righteousness of God as both God’s “relation-restoring love” (a divine property) and “God’s saving deed” (a divine act) …
— p. 56, fn. 6
I was a bit disappointed in the fact that Craig only makes reference to the 1st edition of Moo’s commentary. In the 2nd, Moo chooses slightly different wording:
God’s “experienced attribute” of faithful commitment to his nature and promises. From God’s side, this takes decisive form in his eschatological intervention to vindicate and deliver his people. From the human side, it results in the status of acquittal acquired by the person so declared just.
— p. 241
Notice that Moo has shifted from “From the human side it includes…” to “From the human side, it results in…”. This fixes the problem that Craig mentions about the status being an effect. Also, Moo’s change from “the justifying activity of God” to “God’s ‘experienced attribute’” puts the focus on the property more than his earlier wording.
Nevertheless, Craig might still point out that Moo hasn’t completely corrected his confusing language on this point. Some of the language that Craig objects to still occurs in Moo’s comments on Romans 1:16 (around page 73 and following). Moo also sees the attribute as being, at least primarily, relational and Craig does not.
But despite these criticisms — some of which I think land, despite, as demonstrated above, some being dated — Craig’s position isn’t very far from Moo’s (or Schreiner’s or Thielman’s):
Righteousness in the context of a covenant does entail being faithful to keep one’s promises, but that does not imply that the meaning of “righteousness” is “faithfulness.” Faithfulness is but one manifestation of righteousness.
— Craig, p. 59. This language is especially reminiscent of Schreiner’s language in the Baker Exegetical Commentary, 2nd ed.
Craig is more careful than Moo in drawing proper conceptual distinctions (e.g., pardon vs. acquittal), as one would expect.
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For a list of all of my posts on Douglas Moo’s commentary on Romans, see here.
