Expansive Rhetoric and Progress Over Deep Disagreements
In her paper Epistemic Injustice and Deepened Disagreement, T. J. Lagewaard suggests that an expansive definition of racism (one that would include things like microaggressions, implicit bias, and systems) is a “better concept” than a narrower definition because “an inclusive notion often seems the most ameliorative.” (“Inclusive” in this context means including more things under the heading “racist.”)
But by the standard of amelioration, an argument could be made that this expansive or inclusive rhetoric — not just in regards to racism but in regards to framing nearly everything in terms of justice — actually makes it harder to overcome the sorts of deep disagreement that Lagewaard is concerned with. Lagewaard’s paper is peppered with language of “epistemic justice,” “epistemic injustice” and “injustice-based deep disagreement.”
By immediately adopting the stance that those who disagree with us are engaged in a morally illict activity, we risk putting them in a defensive posture and give them a reason to question our initial credibility on controversial topics. Moral beliefs, including our own moral self-evaluations, are deeply held and often taken to be self-evident. “For we always seem to ourselves righteous and upright and wise and holy — this pride is innate in all of us — unless by clear proofs we stand convinced of our own unrighteousness, foulness, folly, and impurity” (Calvin, Institutes, 1.1.2). Someone who immediately engages us on the grounds that we’re guilty of “testimonial epistemic injustice” will be seen as making a claim that is prima facie highly implausible and who lives in a foreign moral landscape. Why should we take such claims seriously, given our confidence in our moral landscape and in our moral self-assessment?
The points Lagewaard and others want to make about testimony and deep disagreement can be made without framing these things in terms of justice. Obviously, she and others think that, aside from it being true that a receiver’s stance towards testimony can be morally significant (and, thus, a matter of justice), there is also an advantage to burdening the issue with that framework; namely, it could shake off complacency and motivate reassessment. Well, it certainly gets people’s hackles up when you accuse them of injustice. But I’m skeptical that the common response is to take such accusations seriously and engage in heartfelt reassessment.
It might be pointed out that Lagewaard is writing for an academic audience where these terms aren’t unusual or inflammatory. There is no hint of moral outrage in Lagewaard’s paper. But this language inevitably spills over into the popular culture (and already is). Assuming that the term “racism” should be reserved for more serious, narrow offenses, it’s perhaps too late to try to reengage the issue with rhetoric that doesn’t push the stakes of the conversation to the extreme. In fact, it’s widely believed that the stakes of the conversation really are extreme — such that black people are being poached in the streets. Given the immediate existential threat black people face simply for being black, an expansive application of the term “racism” seems entirely appropriate. …Or perhaps some of the perception of the existential threat is in fact owing to the expansive rhetoric? However, approaching discussions of, say, the testimony of black people (an issue that lies behind the inclusive definition of racism) doesn’t need to be burdened with these high stakes. Lagewaard’s points about standpoint epistemology can be legitimately framed as a matter of what’s most reasonable, without the moral baggage. We might see more progress (not necessarily for, say, Lagewaard’s particular points) or at least less toxic discourse on these issues if we took a minimalist/common ground stance.
