Moo, Kant, and Romans 7

There are some striking parallels between Douglas Moo’s interpretation of Romans 7:18 and 20 and Kant, in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:

Moo:

While Paul’s anthropology is essentially “monistic” rather than dualistic — that is, he usually regards people as wholes, in relationship to other things, instead of, as the Greeks did, as divided into distinct “parts,” body (or flesh) and soul (or spirit, or mind) — there is an undeniable element of anthropological dualism as well.[833] This dualism is probably more to the fore in this passage than anywhere else.[834] … It is not that Paul is viewing the flesh as inherently evil, or as necessarily leading to evil,[835] but that he considers the material body to be that part of the person which is particularly susceptible to sin, and which in the non-Christian falls under the dominion of sin. On this view, “that is, in my flesh” qualifies the absolute assertion that “good does not dwell in me.” For good, the will to do the good, is, as Paul has already asserted, part of the egō.[836]

The Letter to the Romans, 2nd ed., p. 482–483

Kant:

“[Man] has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent on nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.

…in that world he is his true self, an intelligence only (while as a human being he is merely an appearance of himself)… Indeed he does not even hold himself responsible for those desires and impluses nor impute them to his true self.”

trans. Abbot (Hill & Zweig), 86 & 94

The quotes from Kant don’t do justice to the extent of the parallels here, but I don’t want to take the time to piece together the quotes. Reading through the third section of Kant’s Groundwork will give those interested a better perspective. (I also don’t want to suggest that there are any parallels between Kant’s metaphysical system and what Moo says, such that Moo would say there is a world of things in themselves and a sensible world. I wonder to what extent the similarities might be due to Kant and Moo coming from the Lutheran tradition… but the connection seems tenuous.)

I’m not drawing attention to these parallels because I think the fact of there being a parallel counts for or against Moo’s reading. Moo’s reading stands or falls on its own merits. But I will admit that while I find Moo’s over-all reading of 7:7–25 persuasive in light of his reading of chapter 6, I was surprised at the way in which Moo framed Paul’s dualism here. (I think the NT does assume a type of substance dualism that Bible scholars are often reluctant to admit — usually because they don’t properly understand dualism or what it might entail or from some mistaken notion that “dualism is Greek,” as if there weren’t Greek monists!) I’m skeptical that Moo’s reading of vvs. 18 and 20 accurately reflect a Pauline dualism. But then, if that’s true then it would weigh against his reading of vvs. 7–25.

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For a list of all of my posts on Douglas Moo’s commentary on Romans, see here.